The Uses of Happiness in Counterinsurgencies

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> Counterinsurgency is another word for brotherly love.
> —Edward G. Lansdale

The section headed "Assessment of Counterinsurgency Operations" in the US Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* of 2006 begins with an epigraph written by a British colonial administrator in Malaya, later an adviser to the US war efforts in Vietnam, Robert Grainger Ker Thompson. The epigraph comes from Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, originally published in 1966 and distilling lessons Thompson learned in the British counterinsurgency in the aforementioned wars. In that paragraph, Thompson acidly aimed at the US war planners of his time and their unwavering reliance on body counts and other statistical measures for evaluating their "success." The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* quotes the older counterinsurgent:

> The two best guides, which can not be readily reduced to statistics or processed through a computer, are an improvement in intelligence voluntarily given by the population and a decrease in the insurgents' recruiting rate. Much can be learnt merely from the faces of the population in villages that are subject to clear-and-hold operations, if these are visited at regular intervals. Faces which at first are resigned and apathetic, or even sullen, six months or a year later are full of cheerful welcoming smiles. The people know who is winning.[1]

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A few paragraphs later, the authors of the *Field Manual* reiterate the importance of assessing the friendliness of the civilians and their "perceptions."[2] Throughout the manual, the authors exhort the counterinsurgent commanders to trust their "subjective and intuitive assessment" rather than "an exclusive focus on data or metrics."[3] A final appendix on "perception assessment" discusses how to create a "perception assessment matrix . . . that compares the intent of [counterinsurgent] operations to the populace's perception of those operations."[4] The perception assessment matrix, despite all foregoing exhortations to intuitive understanding, nevertheless attempts to *measure* the affective responses of the population to counterinsurgency tactics. The matrix itself is listed alongside other analytic tools that are more sociological or geospatial, including a variety of mappings, social network analysis, and historical timelines. The authors of the *Field Manual* invoke the happiness of the population as something that is concurrently a calculable quality that can be slotted into user-friendly matrices and an immeasurable *feeling* to be apprehended by intuitive and culturally aware commanders. This seemingly contradictory combination of two distinct styles does not originate in carelessness but is actually the sedimentation of specific historical approaches to the utility of happiness, a colonial style and a technocratic one.

The subject of this essay is the uses of happiness and sullenness—of emotions—as ways of measuring the success of liberal counterinsurgency efforts. Emotions appear in the writing of all warriors and strategists as crucial to the fighting of wars; and the manipulation of emotions and affect are also crucial to the workings of psychological operations in all sorts of wars. We know that great powers resort to terror and to "shock and awe" to influence enemy morale, and we are familiar with the everyday intimacies and hatreds of warfighting —in bunkers and trenches and across barbed wires and battle lines.

Yet, the utilization of affect *as a mode of measuring success* is seldom analyzed in the context of asymmetric or unconventional warfare that liberal regimes wage ostensibly for the improvement, or liberalization, or democratization of others. Affect in today's counterinsurgencies has a chimerical presence; one catches a glimpse of it in the prosaicism of "hearts and minds," but then it disappears from view as "hearts and minds" is operationalized in writing or on the battlefield. And more often than not, the affective landscape tends to be subsumed by "culture," rediscovered by today's counterinsurgents, and weaponized in their "war among the people."[5]

What I hope to do in this essay is to sketch the uses of happiness in counterinsurgencies and especially in the measurement of their success. In so doing, I want to draw attention to the convergence between two different modes of understanding affect. First, I point to the colonial origins of an affective approach, which sees in happiness or sullenness not only a

measure of success of colonial rule but also something about the essential (racialized) character of intransigent or docile natives. Second, there is a distinctly liberal claim for the utility of emotions—in contradistinction to the use of quantitative metrics on the one hand and sociological measures on the other. I argue that the counterinsurgents' notion of the population's happiness is ultimately a projection of a fantasy generated at the intersection of several overlapping fields of practice: a managerial and technocentric militarism that counterinsurgency disavows but which indelibly marks it, a "cultural" or ethnographic form of military administration that both implicitly and intentionally revivifies the precepts of colonial and imperial administration, and a Utilitarian understanding of happiness currently hegemonic in the United States. My intent in this essay is to scrutinize the work that such an emphasis on the happiness of the civilian populations does in its false implication of intimacy, its assertion of the knowability and legibility of the conquered, and the omniscience of the counterinsurgent in being able to read and judge the affective response of the civilian populations. I will show how such affective language attempts to efface the power relations that are in place, speciously flattening the difference between the occupier and the occupied and erasing politics from the calculus of warfighting.

A Genealogy of Happiness

Although the most familiar appearance of happiness in the politics of the modern Euro-America is with "life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in the preamble to the US constitution and "*le bonheur commun*" enshrined in the French Constitution of 1793,[6] what I want to focus on here is the particular ways in which happiness and affect are instrumentalized in the colonial venture and invoked by the contemporary counterinsurgents. Robert Thompson, cited at the beginning of this article, is not the only British colonial administrator and counterinsurgency adviser whose exhortations for affective modes of assessment leave their accent on counterinsurgency doctrine. T. E. Lawrence, to be discussed below, is another influential figure whose incorporation of happiness and affect into asymmetric warfighting has been profoundly influential. But the traces of this colonial use of affect are also present in a colonial vernacular echoing through current counterinsurgency discourse, and in the imperial institutions and laws whose historical centrality the more recent technocratic discourse of happiness in counterinsurgencies effaces.

The colonial vernacular is notably familiar from a broad variety of contexts. The implicit comparison between the "happy natives" of one place and the "sullen natives" of another points not only to the geographical reach of empire but also to its affective classification of colonized people

on the basis of their perceived docility in the heat of colonial counterinsurgencies. For example, in an account of the intransigence of Filipinos during the US colonization of that island in 1899, a proponent of empire declares that "the mirthful, easy-going African is superior to these treacherous and blood-thirsty hybrid Malays."[7] The racial categories overlay an intuited and "felt" affective map, itself generated through an assessment of a people in conditions of colonial conquest. That the basis of this mapping exercise is a condition of enmity in warfighting becomes clear when one sees that the same people can be described within the framework of a kind of "love-hate relationship" that can praise "a 'different' type of native, his 'likeability,' democracy, frankness, sense of humour" and also disparage "his 'savageness' [and] 'treachery.' "[8] Perhaps most indicative of this attitude is the famous Rudyard Kipling poem, "White Man's Burden," in which Kipling celebrates the US conquest of "Your new-caught, sullen peoples/half devil and half child" of the Philippines.[9]

That race lies at the heart of this affective categorization is most striking in the prolific records Winston Churchill made of the successive small wars in which he fought or reported. To Churchill, the Pashtun of the Northwest Frontier were surly and inscrutable, "as degraded a race as any on the fringe of humanity: fierce as the tiger, but less cleanly; as dangerous, not so graceful. . . . Truth is unknown among them."[10] The Sudanese, on the other hand, combined "fanatical frenzy" and "fatalistic apathy."[11] By contrast, Churchill saw the white Boers of South Africa as "the most good-hearted enemy I have ever fought against in the four continents in which it has been my fortune to see active service."[12] In this colonial vernacular, affect—good-heartedness, sullenness, frenzy, or apathy—was essentially an indelible and static character trait and symptomatic of racial hierarchies.

The violence of these affective categories, the sheer bloody imposition of happiness and intimacy on uncooperative natives, also worked through the gendering of these imperial relations. A vast corpus of perceptive scholarship concerns the ways in which race, gender, class, and sexuality were conjugated to produce colonial domination cloaked in the intimacies of affect.[13] Two elements of this imperial intimacy in particular continue to structure the affective landscape of US counterinsurgencies. First, the interrelated feminization of the colonized man and the power-saturated (homo)erotics of colonial sentiment transform notions of masculinity, shaping hierarchies that at root reinforce colonial powers.[14] Second, this gendering produces the illusion that this affective approach is softer, more feminine, and more imbued with an understanding of the native. This gendering insists on specifically cultural forms of knowledge about making the colonized visible and legible for the purposes of colonial administration but doing so through humane means. I will speak about the contemporary manifestations of both these strands below.

Finally, affection and disaffection are legislated and institutionalized in the imperial context. As Martha Kaplan has shown in the context of Fiji, the British transformed affection from a " 'thing' that is not a thing"[15] to a concrete set of legal guidelines that criminalized "disaffection" as sedition, laying the legal basis for prosecution of colonized groups considered insufficiently docile, affectionate toward the empire, or "happy" with their lot.[16] These technologies of "colonial governmentality" were necessary additions to the arsenal of what the British called "imperial policing" or the ability to administer conquered and colonized populations in ways that preempted the possibility of revolt and permitted management of populations via fissures of race or class or gender.[17]

This history of happiness and affect in the colonial context is one strand of practice influencing US military doctrine for counterinsurgencies. As important is a more recent "turn to happiness"[18] in academic, popular, and policy spheres. Popular therapeutic and self-help texts proliferate providing guidelines on how to find happiness. The disciplines of psychology, economics, and public policy all include subspecializations in how to operationalize and measure happiness. *Journal of Happiness Studies* provides a forum for research on how to make populations happy and how to quantify the extent of their happiness and its correlation with their material well-being. Official happiness indices are being considered as possible supplements to measures of economic growth by several governments worldwide.[19] As Foucault had presciently foreseen, happiness has become central to the practices of governmentality.[20]

Military Affects

In military planning and warfighting, affect and emotions—in the guise of courage, morale, fear, fraternity, hatred, and terror—have always been significant factors with which strategists and tacticians have grappled. No greater an authority on warfare than Carl von Clausewitz dedicates significant sections of *On War* to courage, pride, enthusiasm, boldness, firmness, and staunchness.[21] In his writing, these are the characteristics of the warrior, or the "moral" elements of war,[22] rather than standards of measurement for the effectiveness of warfighting. Clausewitz most often emphasizes such moral qualities in the making of strategy, rather than the specific moments of combat or in gauging the success of tactics.[23] For affect as a means of apprehending populations (rather than warriors) we have to look to liberal counterinsurgencies and the preceding imperial policing actions that have indelibly influenced them.

According to its theoreticians and practitioners, US-style "population-centric" counterinsurgency is a war with a developmental element, fought among populations that need to be persuaded by the counterinsurgents'

ability to "protect" them through defeating the guerrilla forces that prey upon the more-or-less neutral populations. Because the guerrilla can only be defeated if his base of operation is cleared, and since this base of operation is often in the midst of populations in urban centers or in population concentrations in the countryside, engaging him would entail taking the war into the heart of the civilian population (I use the metaphoric language—"hearts" of populations—consciously). This entails door-to-door searches, invasion of those civilian spaces usually considered "private," and using tunnels created by punching holes through walls between houses for ease and concealment of movement of military personnel. Even killing becomes a more personal business. As Vietnam-era counterinsurgent John Paul Vann argued, counterinsurgency "is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle—you know who you're killing."[24]

As such, counterinsurgency inevitably becomes bound up with relations between the counterinsurgent and the population that are face-to-face and constantly intruding upon everyday spaces, what Derek Gregory, borrowing from Ann Laura Stoler, has called a "rush to the intimate."[25] Just as important are the ways in which the discourses of warfighting are "feminized" in counterinsurgency, with emphasis on humanitarianism, on soft tactics, and on ostensibly thoughtful "soldier-scholars" rather than "warriors" designing the doctrine and practices of warfighting.[26] Both because of the importance counterinsurgency theory grants to persuading civilians to "get off the fence," and because of the intimacy—the face-to-faceness—of tactical operations of counterinsurgency, utilizing affect and being able to read and measure it become a central technique both of fighting and of evaluating the fight.

This, of course, is nothing new. Asymmetric wars fought against guerrilla forces, often in colonial contexts, are where affects were instrumentalized, both as a tool of warfighting and as a mechanism for measuring the efficacy of counterinsurgency practices. These wars were wars "among people" or wars fought in the "social milieu."[27] The great tactician of small wars and colonial warfighter, T. E. Lawrence, had as far back as the 1920s articulated three factors required for guerrilla warfare: first, the algebraic (of spaces to be traveled, territory, and number of troops); second, the biological (which includes the extent of endurance of the fighters); and finally, and most intriguingly, the psychological. Lawrence writes that this psychological factor

> considers the capacity for *mood of the men*, their complexities and mutability, and the cultivation of what in them profits the intention. We had to arrange [the] men's minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as

> other officers arranged their bodies: and not only their own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as it could reach them: and thirdly, *the mind of the nation supporting it behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on*.[28]

A more lucid statement of intent for psychological warfare is yet to be written. The enumeration of the "minds of the enemy" and of nations, both one's own and the adversary's, all point to the specific ways in which affect needed to be utilized, not only to motivate one's own side to fight but also to influence the fighting of the enemy. Lawrence was well aware of the importance of affect, and his "27 Articles"—giving advice on how to be military advisers to Arabs recruited to fight the Ottomans—suggest how Arab behavior can be influenced through engineering emotions. What Lawrence emphasized, both in his instructions and in his own activities, was a kind of affective experience that wasn't easily translatable across contexts, and which could not easily be modularized.[29] The extraordinary claim for the colonial warrior to be able to read the mood—and the face—of the enemy and enemy nations needed some sort of support. More efficacious administration of the enemy, making them more affectively legible and less inscrutable, entailed knowledge of languages and habits and a fine-grained ability to observe and learn how to act in accordance with unspoken rules of behavior in a given context—a stock in trade of British colonial administrators, ethnographers, and advertisers.

The idea of being able to read the mood of men persists over the century since Lawrence wrote his advice for small warriors. Lawrence continues to be read and emulated by today's counterinsurgents (David Kilcullen, the most influential theorist of counterinsurgency, wrote his own "Twenty-Eight Articles" modeled after Lawrence's "27 Articles"), not only because of his viscerally effective writing but also because he is seen to have forged friendships with the Arab men he led in war, a kind of imperial intimacy that gave him the necessary inroads to knowing the inscrutable natives. These affective relations are considered so important that Major Jim Gant, a US Army Special Forces officer whose vision of pacification of Afghanistan included establishing intimate relationships with Afghan civilians, was dubbed "Lawrence of Afghanistan." Gant's much-circulated policy paper on tribes in Afghanistan was prefaced with a passage about love-hate relations with the natives that could have been taken from the writings of British colonial administrators a century ago (as delineated above): "I love the people and the rich history of Afghanistan. They will give you their last bite of food in the morning and then try and kill you in the evening. A people who, despite their great poverty, are as happy as any American I have ever met."[30] This happiness was amply visually illustrated by many photographs of Gant embracing Afghan children,

having convivial meetings with the tribal elders, and the like. He writes of how every Afghan is a tribal and, thus, beholden to honor, tribal pride, and saving face. The Afghan tribal has no strategic goal but wants to project its power across the valley. When Gant meets and drinks tea with an Afghan "tribal leader," he speaks of how comfortable they were together and summarizes the moral of the story as being "the absolute necessity of working with and bonding with the tribal leader—man-to-man, warrior-to-warrior." Gant also tells us that one of his gatekeepers would allow him to play with his children and would tell him, "Jim, I am getting too old. Play with the children today. They love you."[31] The Afghans of Gant's writing are simple creatures, devoid of politics or strategy, and entirely receptive to masculinist bonds of fraternity with a happy American occupier who had come to tea and stayed to play with the kids. They embody the fantasy of the sullen Pashtuns turned into happy and docile natives through the affective ministrations of the Afghan Lawrence.

The Affective Life of Advertising in War

The imperial British self-proclaimed ability to read the mood of the natives has become legendary through the production of a vast series of memoirs, novels, and other informal and formal texts in which colonial district officers excelled in the ethnographic techniques in imperial management, policing, and warfare.[32] For all of them, local knowledge—linguistic or ethnographic—provided the necessary "data" that made the usually inscrutable natives legible to colonial administrators (or at least reduced them to colonial "types" that could be administered accordingly). This legibility mattered because it allowed the colonial administrators to calibrate their use of coercion or incentives on the basis of the reactions of the "natives." Significantly, these reactions were affective: the *resentment* of the natives had to be forestalled, their *sullenness* overcome, their *amenability* and *amiability* ensured. This legibility was then placed in the service of both colonial techniques of governmentality and the use of violence.

If an ability to read the natives by having "gone native" oneself was the administrative habit of the British colonial counterinsurgents (or at least their self-serving self-image), the US version of affective appeal was most clearly articulated during the heydays of the Vietnam War by Edward G. Lansdale. Lansdale, who engineered the defeat of the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, was involved in the Bay of Pigs and in Vietnam and has the distinction of appearing in two seminal novels about his time; as Colonel Hillendale in Eugene Lederer and William Burdick's *The Ugly American*, and as Alden Pyle in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American*.[33] Even at the height of his military career, Lansdale was ultimately an advertising man,

a job he had excelled at before the Second World War. If, as a famous counterinsurgent of our time calls counterinsurgency "armed social work" (or "armed social science"),[34] then psyops ("psychological operations" of old and today's "information operations") can be labeled "armed advertising." A trickster, evangelist of psyops, and "civic action" guru, Lansdale personified the emphasis on affect and culture in counterinsurgencies and had famously claimed that "counterinsurgency is another word for brotherly love."[35] David Halberstam's miniature portrait of Edward Lansdale is caustic and acute:

> It was as if Brigadier General Edward Geary Lansdale had been invented with the Kennedy Administration in mind. He was a former advertising man, a former Air Force officer, a CIA agent now, a man deeply interested in doing things in Asia the right way, the modern way. . . . [He] was against big bumbling US government programs run by insensitive, boastful, bureaucratic, materialistic racists, and for small indigenous programs run by folksy, modest American country boys who knew the local mores, culture and language. He was the Good American because in part his own experience had convinced him that Americans were, in fact, good, and that the American experience and American ideals were valid elsewhere.[36]

Lansdale's extraordinary memoir of his times in Asia brims with anecdotes about how he affectively engaged the Filipinos and Vietnamese people he encountered. He tells us that "anyone who wants to see the Vietnamese at their gregarious best and to find out what the public is saying about current events needs to go on a gastronomical excursion among the soup stands. It's a delicious way to take a political survey." Or that "A good smile is a great passport. Use it!"[37] Perhaps more sinister—if familiar—is how he suggests children can be used to gauge the mood of the occupied population. Lansdale insists, "In guerrilla territory, the children are a barometer," and tells the story of how two US foreign service officers distributed large jars of candy among the local Vietnamese children, with very specific ends in mind and having "read" the emotional terrain of the natives: "The elders, not to be outdone in hospitality, invited us into their home for tea."[38]

When it came to assessing counterinsurgency, Lansdale's famous "x-factors" memo is central to how he envisioned instrumentalizing affect. Challenging the prevalent method of body counts as the most effective form of metrics for measuring success in counterinsurgency, the memo, written to McNamara himself, lays out what Lansdale thought worthy of evaluation.[39] The series of questions formulated to gauge the situation in Vietnam is expansive and mostly sociological (number of villagers; houses; the quality of "autonomous defense"; how the village is governed; what are the processes and procedures Vietnamese troops and their US advisers use, etc.). But what differentiates his list from other sociological

assessment measures put forward by his contemporaries, for example by Bernard Fall, is the emphasis Lansdale places on recording the emotional reactions alongside sociological facts.[40] His questions include the following:

> What was the villagers' attitude towards the Vietnamese troops? Friendly, indifferent, sullen, afraid, hostile? Where were the children, outdoors or kept hidden indoors? Where were the young women?
>
> Were people happy to have the troops there, uneasy, or indifferent?
>
> What is the attitude of the troops on patrol? Aggressive?
>
> What are the feelings of troops about being in military service? Proud to be in uniform? Indifferent? Proud of unit? Indifferent? Homesick? Worn out?

This insistence on the ability to read and measure affection and disaffection for the US and Vietnamese forces was not too far off the colonial model deployed by the British in their empire. When defending his memo to McNamara, Lansdale was to have said that it "represented the feelings of the Vietnamese people. 'That is the vital element in a people's war.' Without that, Lansdale continued, all the secretary's other tallies would be false and misleading."[41] Although the memo was famously ignored at the time, Lansdale's preferred mode of operation was to be lauded and valued much later and emulated by many of today's counterinsurgents. For example, General David Petraeus, when put in charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in Afghanistan, issued a twenty-four-point Counterinsurgency Guidance in August 2010 that included such commands as: "Take off your sunglasses. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oakleys."

Or more broadly: "Earn the people's trust, talk to them, ask them questions, and learn about their lives. . . . Be aware of others in the room and how their presence may affect the answers you get. . . . Spend time, listen, consult and drink lots of tea."[42]

In fact, drinking tea with the locals has become a euphemism for generating intimacies with the Afghan and Iraqi populations. It not only may yield tactical intelligence but also acts as a measure of how close a military person, or a member of the Human Terrain Team, can get to the "village elders" or the "regular Afghans." The idea has become so absurdly pervasive that Greg Mortenson—a civilian who had written an earnest, though very problematic and later debunked, screed about "drinking teas" with tribal Afghans and improving them through educating their daughters—was invited to give the military advice on Afghans and "to help translate the theory of counterinsurgency into tribal realities on the ground."[43]

Mortenson explains the tea-drinking ritual by ostensibly quoting a Pashtun elder: "Here we drink three cups of tea to do business: the first

you are a stranger, the second you become a friend, and the third you join our family, and for our family we are prepared to do anything—even die."[44] One admiring profile of Mortenson indicated that "the phrase 'three cups of tea' has entered the American troop lexicon as shorthand for any leisurely, trust-building chat with locals."[45]

Tea drinking also appears in a series of controversial reports in which US Army intelligence officer and author Paula Broadwell sketched the destruction of the village of Tarok Kolache in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan. In October 2010, US military jets bombed the village to dust in retaliation for the loss of a number of US forces in the vicinity of the village. In her reports—drenched in military jargon and acronyms—Broadwell described an Afghan villager's distress at the destruction of his property as "a fit of theatrics" and broadly declaimed the same US forces who had destroyed the village for putting together plans to rebuild it.[46] When her account was challenged in the blogosphere, she defended her assessment of the operation by invoking affective clichés:

> Children played on the road nearby, circling their bikes, waving at the soldiers, ogling the first female "patroller" they'd ever seen in the area. . . . Perhaps I had a false sense of security, but everyone I passed on the patrol was extremely friendly and happy to interact with the soldiers along the way. In fact, their dusty faces were all smiles. . . . After my fourth cup of tea with the Tarok Kalache Malik, the elected village representative, I asked him about the villagers' perceptions of coalition efforts, especially those relating to the . . . airstrikes last summer. . . . "No. We do not harbor resentment against the coalition forces."[47]

The happy natives, the importance of perception and of managing the natives' resentment, and smiling, ogling children are all present in Broadwell's narrative. And she even exceeds the obligatory number of cups of tea drunk with the locals!

Quantitative Metrics and Sociological Measures

The affective tactics and measurements so championed, however, stand in contrast with quantitative metrics, the most prevalent mode of measurement of success in the US military, in the present and in the past. The US military's fascination with quantification and statistics as means of streamlining the bureaucratic structure of the War Department (later Department of Defense) goes back to the introduction of Taylorism and scientific management to both the internal bureaucracy and the acquisition systems of that department by Secretary of War Elihu Root.[48] However, it took the Second World War to bring in statistics and quantitative sciences to warfighting itself.

The vast number of social scientists who signed up with the US and British war efforts brought their skills to forecasting and generating intelligence about everything that may influence the war, from agricultural yields of allies and enemies and the methods of production of ammunition to the process of target selection in the strategic air command. The skills most celebrated were those of the economists with their ability to manipulate numbers and extract clear numeric measures and projections out of the mess of blood, debris, and metal that was the war.[49] The econometric and statistical tools embraced by the bombing command then became an inseparable element of the calculus of war for decades to come—and especially in nuclear strategy—when they were transported by the Rand Corporation whiz kids into the very heart of Pentagon.[50] The whiz kids, many of whom had been the alumni of the strategic bombing command, included such figures as Bernard Brodie who in an abrasive and influential article in the mid-1950s argued that in matters concerning strategy the experience of soldiers in warfighting had to be subordinated to the calculations of economists who could mathematically measure the effects of an action and the conditions of its possibility. He advocated the use of "marginal utility" by military strategists in evaluating their military aims, from planning for war to target selection.[51]

In his role as secretary of defense, Robert McNamara further consolidated the use of statistical measures. An MBA, accountant, and statistician who had also been involved in target selection and bombing efficacy measurements of the Pacific Air Command during the Second World War, he served very briefly as the president of Ford Motor Company, before being chosen by John F. Kennedy to head the Pentagon.[52] McNamara introduced econometrics, systems analysis, and statistics to both the bureaucracy of the Pentagon and to the evaluation processes of the now-escalating war in Vietnam.[53] The horrors of how these quantitative metrics shaped action in the field are well-known. Body counts and casualty figures became the streamlined instruments of statistical measurement and, as a recent study of these evaluation mechanisms argues, because higher body counts were considered signs of good warfighting, not only were the numbers padded and bodies double-counted, but rather more horrifyingly, higher firepower was used and more civilians were killed in pursuit of "better numbers."[54]

By the end of the war, the body counts were being attacked both inside the military and by the wider public. Indeed, John Vann's aforementioned maxim about face-to-face killing in counterinsurgencies was a response to the industrial-scale slaughter of the Vietnamese that body counts encouraged. Despite the widespread discrediting of McNamara's methods and measures, in the first few years of both the Iraq and Afghan wars, the same methods of evaluation were deployed until the counter-

insurgents took over in 2006/2007 in Iraq. David Kilcullen remembers with disgust the "detailed, very jargon-filled, and intricate PowerPoint brief on the latest trends, followed by a strictly quantitative assessment of progress, based on numbers of various incidents over time."[55] The solution devised by General David Petraeus and his commanders and advisers (who included Kilcullen) entailed a "surge" of soldiers; the deployment of punitive violence; separation of populations by walls; encirclement of intransigent neighborhoods and—in the case of Falluja—a whole city; a notable spike in the number of detainees; and perhaps most important, bribing some former insurgents to become collaborators.[56]

To measure the effectiveness of *these* military practices, the counterinsurgents devised various new metrics. These were not columns of numbers and statistical projections but very specific sociological indices measuring the transformation of the postwar social and political landscape. Kilcullen himself widely circulated a paper on metrics in Afghanistan that rejected the utility of body counts or the number of attacks on the forces.[57] Instead, he offered a series of indicators that measured changes at the state level, US military operational level, and Afghan civilian level. In the latter group, Kilcullen included the "number of unsolicited tip-offs from the population," price of vegetables grown outside a district (indicating the ease and safety of transport), tax collection rates, "rate of new business formation and loan repayment," and as an echo of Malaya, "percentage of local people with secure title to their house and land."[58] Kilcullen insisted that these measures needed to be "carefully interpreted, applying judgments and qualitative reasoning, rather than simply counted."[59] Many of the indicators are those Bernard Fall, Robert Thompson, and Ed Lansdale would have found very familiar from their experience in Southeast Asia.

The sociological approach to measuring the success of counterinsurgency, however, does have some distinguishing features from the affective style. For example, David Kilcullen sternly advises *against* befriending local children, that enduring bromide of past and present affective counterinsurgencies. Kilcullen writes:

> Stop your people from fraternizing with the local children. . . . Children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy, and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching: They will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child, and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the children at arm's length.[60]

Not for Kilcullen the invitation to the family's house secured through distribution of sweets, though an instrumental assessment of children as

the bellwether of violence is exactly how Lansdale viewed the child-play of his time. Kilcullen here pays attention to affect but in breach. In other places he is even clearer on how he conceptualizes affect: "Build trusted networks. . . . This is the true meaning of the phrase hearts and minds, which comprises two separate components. Hearts means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; minds means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has anything to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts."[61]

The passage brilliantly embodies how emotions and affect insinuate themselves into the discussions of counterinsurgency even when they are disavowed or displaced by sociological factors. Kilcullen rejects the idea of "hearts and minds" as being about emotions, but through a telling slippage he invokes the concept of "calculated self-interest" or "utility," which Utilitarian philosophers—foremost among them Jeremy Bentham—equated precisely and uncannily to "happiness."[62] Jeremy Bentham's "felicific calculus" is the essence of the kind of civilian Kilcullen and so many other counterinsurgents imagine: a rational utility maximizer, shorn of ideology, or commitment, or politics, or indeed a desire for justice, revenge, or retribution.

The Meanings of Happiness in Counterinsurgency

Why does it matter if the counterinsurgents insist on incorporating affect in their calculus of war? What are the meanings and uses of happiness in counterinsurgencies, its geneaology?

As I already have mentioned above, the peculiar place of happiness in counterinsurgency thinking is produced through the conjugation of US technocentric militarism, the sedimentation of colonial discourse and practice in contemporary counterinsurgency, and finally, the hegemonic status of Utilitarian notions of happiness so prevalent in the techniques of governmentality in our neoliberal age.

In the United States, a managerial, and more specifically Taylorist, style of discipline—dependent on measurement and quantification—became the norm in not only the organizational structures of military and civilian bureaucracies in the United States but also in the very process of war making itself. This introduction of econometrics, statistics, expert knowledge, and the like, in the Pentagon and on the battlefield, reflects an infatuation with scientistic understandings of populations that were otherwise illegible or inscrutable to a colonialist and later imperialist US administration from the ninetenth century onward. In a sense what distinguishes the US mode of imperial management overseas from its predecessors—the British being the closest in ethos and method—is this

insistence on the possibility of "measuring" and "modeling" realities and of "engineering" transformations. Hence, it is no surprise at all that technically totalizing solutions are posited as the response to what are profoundly political problems. This scientism has translated into the military's exquisite sensitivity to social science fashions prevalent in the US academy best reproduced through the two-way traffic between the US security apparatus and various academic institutions, the inclusion of social sciences in the agendas of military-specific research institutions, and the research funding provided by US military and security organizations in all social science disciplines. Thus, the technocentrism that characterizes the US military and that is sorely lamented by its establishment critics—among them Ed Lansdale[63]—is the very characteristic that also endorses the use of affects as a military solution to intractable problems, since affect is considered an innovative new technology for addressing problems that only supreme technological and scientific knowledge could resolve.

This technocratic solution itself veils the colonial foundations of imperial intimacies. These intimacies work on the one hand through a gendered softening of the discourse of counterinsurgency, its convergence with military humanitarianism, and a kind of "empire of affections," and on the other hand through a body of ethnographic knowledge that has long been instrumentalized in US warfighting.[64] Ed Lansdale is again instructive. He was known to be an avid collector of Filipino folk songs and to have used these songs in his psychological operations. In this he directly emulated the British colonial officers who had preceded him and whose textured knowledge of the peoples they conquered and ruled could be transformed into colonial intelligence.[65] Anthropologist Montgomery McFate has written about the usefulness of ethnography for the military in the War on Terror as the institution improves its knowledge of "adversary culture." The examples she gives include a better strategic awareness of the "tribal nature of Iraqi society" (and how tribes "cannot be bought but can be hired"); an operational appreciation that unlike modern cultures, the Iraqis use rumors as a means of dissemination of news; and tactical development of one-to-one relationships.[66] McFate became one of the founders of the military's Human Terrain System, which couples military officers with social scientists to interview local populations and collect not only ethnographic intelligence but also engage in tactical interrogation of detainees.[67] Even more intriguingly, McFate's doctoral research was about the last major British colonial conflict in the twentieth century, its pacification of Northern Ireland.[68] In both her doctoral thesis and her subsequent work for the US military, cultural understanding of affect and social relations was seen as a panacea for too much technocentric metrics. But "culture" here is also a peculiar thing: it is static and unchanging. Where this type of "cultural" understanding intersects with affect is in its explicit

or implicit reference to "national characters," of sullen peoples or happy natives. So, Major Gant can write about the "happy" Pashtun people he met, or their enduring and timeless characteristics, whether that is their "hospitality" or their lack of strategic thinking. Local knowledge, of languages and habits of occupied peoples, simply allows better understanding of their characters; these are the skills of the good colonial administrator. Having tea with the locals, or the whole gamut of "face-to-face" relations and intimacies, is a way of reading their affect, and of utilizing this affect as another bit in the mosaic of intelligence so valued by counterinsurgents.

Finally, the uses of happiness in counterinsurgency reflect the hegemonic meaning of happiness in neoliberalism. The kind of happiness around which so much economic and psychological theory is built—and the kind of happiness that seems to be at the heart of affective counterinsurgencies—ultimately seems very much the same as the utility at the base of rationalist theories of self-interest. Counterinsurgency affect insists on *individual* sources of happiness, depends on the improving intent of the counterinsurgent, and privileges a quantifiable notion of happiness. Precisely because the happiness of the population subjected to counterinsurgency is something to be located in a perception matrix and measured, this kind of happiness is an "enterprise form," and in contexts where wars are *not* being waged, it would be a form of neoliberal governmentality.[69] On a battlefield, the uses of happiness work both to coerce the population and to veil this coercion.

When counterinsurgents assume that they can "read" the faces of the population and therefore measure their affect and perception, they explicitly indicate that their practices are crucial to establishing intimacies with the local population. These intimacies are not neutral. They are not simply cognitive. They are not only social and relational but also political, even as the counterinsurgents present their work as tactical or technical solutions to the intractable problem of insurgency. If "intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way,"[70] then the affective terrain, the ability to observe and measure the affective responses of people we understand is also a way of acting on them or enacting upon them a fantasy of who we think they are and should be. The will to "befriend," the claim to recognize the affective terrain of the civilian population who are to be "protected" or controlled, is ultimately about being able to shape their actions and reactions, their personhood. If they become friends, then they have "chosen" us and in so choosing they have taken a rational step toward the kind of enlightened, civilized personhood with whom an American can do business. Their disaffection is ultimately an act of sedition against the sovereign imperial force. In the end, despite protestations of good intent, affective intimacy is intended

to instantiate power, and the friendly smile of the civilian population is an indication that they are now obedient and docile, made amenable to improvement and civilization.

The happy native who is the object of counterinsurgency not only is the measure of the success of counterinsurgency in ostensibly producing docile client populations but also acts as a useful instrument for influencing "the mind of the nation supporting [the counterinsurgent] behind the firing-line," as T. E. Lawrence wrote nearly a century ago. This nation that needs to rise in support of counterinsurgency are the Americans of today. Here, what is in operation is "a sentimentality that a hegemonic ambition requires,"[71] producing a seductive cloak to efface the ultimate power imbalance at work in the moment of armed encounter. The sentimental image of a smiling Afghan, of children greeting the kind invader with smiles and waves, is the alibi the counterinsurgent needs to persuade the people at home that his imperial intents—his walls, surveillance, detention centers, special operations, drones, and kinetic killing actions—are ultimately humanitarian.

Notes

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1. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (St Petersburg: Hailer, 2006 [1966]), 170; quoted in United States Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual: US Army Field Manual No. 3-24; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), paragraphs 5-90 through 5-112.

2. US Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, paragraph 5-111. On the importance of perceptions, see Ben Anderson, "Population and Affective Perception: Biopolitics and Anticipatory Action in US Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Antipode* 43 (2011): 205–36.

3. US Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, paragraphs 4-26, 5-91, 5-96, 6-61, 6-64.

4. Ibid., paragraph B-19.

5. Rochelle Davis, "Culture as a Weapon," *Middle East Report* 255 (2010), www.merip.org/mer/mer255/culture-weapon.

6. Darrin McMahon, *The Pursuit of Happiness: A History from the Greeks to the Present* (London: Allen Lane, 2006). On affect as a form of relational attachments and "public intimacy," see inter alia Lauren Berlant, "Intimacy: A Special Issue," *Critical Inquiry* 24 (1998): 281–88.

7. Nerissa Balce, "The Filipina's Breast: Savagery, Docility, and the Erotics of the American Empire," *Social Text* 24, no. 2 (2006): 102.

8. Akbar Ahmed, "An Aspect of the Colonial Encounter in the North-West Frontier Province," *Asian Affairs* 9 (1978): 321.

9. Ibid.

10. Winston Churchill, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* (London: Longmans, Green, 1897).

11. Winston Churchill, *The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan* (London: Longmans, Green, 1902).

12. Winston Churchill, *My Early Life* (London: Eland Publishing, 2000 [1930]), 255. For more on this convergence between colonial small wars, racialization, and affect see Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

13. See inter alia Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (London: Routledge, 1995); Amy Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," *American Literature* 70 (1998): 581–606; Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ramón A. Gutierrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Laura Wexler, *Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an Age of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

14. Robert Aldrich, *Colonialism and Homosexuality* (London: Routledge, 2002).

15. McMahon, *Pursuit of Happiness*, xi.

16. Martha Kaplan, "'The Dangerous and Disaffected Native' in Fiji: British Colonial Constructions of the Tuka Movement," *Social Analysis* 26 (1989): 22–45; Martha Kaplan and John D. Kelly, "Rethinking Resistance: Dialogics of 'Disaffection' in Colonial Fiji," *American Ethnologist* 21 (1994): 123–51. I am grateful to a *Social Text* referee for pointing me to this particular strand of scholarship.

17. David Scott, "Colonial Governmentality," *Social Text* 43 (1995): 191–220. For the characteristics of imperial policing, see Khalili, *Time in the Shadows*, 27–30, and Laleh Khalili, "The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency," *Middle East Report* 255 (2010): 14–23.

18. Sara Ahmed, *The Promise of Happiness* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 3.

19. Derek Bok, *The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from the New Research on Well-Being* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 4.

20. Foucault had described the technologies of the self that were foundational to governmentality as permitting "individuals to effect, by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality." Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18. Also see Sam Binkley, "Happiness, Positive Psychology, and the Program of Neoliberal Governmentality," *Subjectivity* 4 (2011): 371–94.

21. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. J. J. Graham (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1997), 41–42; 46.

22. For example, Clausewitz, *On War*, 87. Also see Mark Moyar's recent updating of the list to "initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization" as necessary qualities of a counterinsurgent leader in Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 8–11.

23. Clausewitz, *On War*, 66–69.

24. Neil Sheehan, *Bright Shining Lie*: *John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (London: Picador, 1988), 317.

25. Derek Gregory, "The Rush to the Intimate," *Radical Philosophy Review* 160 (2008): 8–23.

26. I discuss the feminization, and gendering more broadly, of counterinsurgency and such intimate invasions in much greater detail in Laleh Khalili, "Gendered Practices of Counterinsurgency," *Review of International Studies* 37 (2011): 1471–91.

27. Jean Nemo, "La Guerre dans le Milieu Social," *Revue de Défense Nationale* XII (1956): 605–26; see the updated version, Rupert Smith's conception of war among people in Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2005).

28. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," in *T. E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia*, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), 266–67. Emphasis added.

29. This colonial intimacy was saturated with a kind of orientalist homoerotic desire which further gave Lawrence the license to speak knowingly of his Arab guerrillas. Joseph Massad, *Desiring Arabs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 164; Aldrich, *Colonialism*, 71–79. I am grateful to Tavia Nyong'o for pointing me to these sources.

30. Ann Scott Tyson, "Jim Gant, the Green Beret Who Could Win the War in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, 17 January 2007; Major Jim Gant, *One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan* (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009), 8.

31. It is also apt to note that Gant decided to join the Green Berets upon reading a novel about Special Forces in Vietnam and their experience of fighting alongside collaborating indigenous fighters. See Tyson, "Gant."

32. Talal Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (Amherst, NY: Humanities Press, 1973); especially, Stephan Feuchtwang's "The Discipline and Its Sponsors: The Colonial Formation of British Social Anthropology," in ibid., 71–100; Suke Wolton, *Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office, and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War: The Loss of White Prestige* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Michael Crawshaw, "Running a Country: The British Colonial Experience and Its Relevance to Present Day Concerns," *The Shrivenham Papers* 3, report, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, 2007.

33. Jonathan Nashel, *Edward Lansdale's Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 149–86. Nashel claims that there are doubts about Pyle being based on Lansdale, but most contemporaneous sources assumed as much.

34. David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86 (2006): 103–8.

35. Edward Lansdale, c. 1965, quoted in Cecil B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American* (New York: Brassey's, 1998), 261.

36. David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Balantine Books, 1992 [1969]), 124.

37. Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 348, 376.

38. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 376, 151.

39. "Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)," Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 66 A 3542 Vietnam 1962, 000.1-091, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963; Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 237.

40. Bernard B. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Counterinsurgency," *Naval*

War College Review (Winter 1998 [April 1965]): 46–57. Fall enumerated villages paying taxes and hosting government-appointed teachers as places where counterinsurgency succeeded.

41. Currey, *Lansdale*, 2.

42. David H. Petraeus, "COMISAF's Counterinsurgency Guidance," memorandum from Commander, International Security Assistance Force for the "Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces–Afghanistan," 1 August 2010, stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.113197.1280774784!/menu/standard/file/COMISAF%27s%20COIN%20Guidance%2C%201Aug10.pdf.

43. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Unlikely Tutor Giving Military Afghan Advice," *New York Times*, 17 July 2010; Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Extraordinary Journey to Promote Peace . . . One School at a Time* (London: Penguin Books, 2006). On Mortenson's fall from grace and scandals surrounding his charity, see Jon Krakauer, *Three Cups of Deceit: How Greg Mortenson, Humanitarian Hero, Lost His Way* (San Francisco: Byliner.com, 2011). It is worth noting that Mortenson's parents had been Christian missionaries in Afghanistan, and *Three Cups of Tea* is animated by a liberal missionary zeal about educating girls.

44. Mortenson, *Three Cups*, back cover.

45. Laura King, "'Three Cups of Tea' a Byword for U.S. Effort to Win Afghan Hearts and Minds," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 August 2010.

46. Paula Broadwell, "Travels with Paula: A Time to Build," *Foreign Policy*, blog post, 13 January 2011, ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/travels_with_paula_i_a_time_to_build.

47. Paula Broadwell, "Travels with Paula, III: Arghandabis Like the Coalition Reconstruction Efforts," *Foreign Policy*, blog post, 23 January 2011, ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/23/travels_with_paula_iii_arghandabis_like_the_coalition_reconstruction_efforts.

48. Hugh G. J. Aitken, *Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal: Scientific Management in Action 1908–1915* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Russell F. Weigley, "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," in *Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare*, ed. William Geffen (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Academy, 1969).

49. Robert J. Leonard, "War as a 'Simple Economic Problem,'" in *Economics and National Security: A History of Their Interaction*, ed. Craufurd D. W. Goodwin (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 265.

50. Alex Abella, *Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008).

51. Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a Science," *World Politics* 1 (1949): 477–80.

52. Robert McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Times Books, 1995); Deborah Shapley, *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).

53. Gregory Daddis, *No Sure Victory: Measuring US Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 34.

54. Daddis, *No Sure Victory*, 97.

55. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (London: Hurst, 2009), 121.

56. Gregory, "The Rush to the Intimate."

57. David Kilcullen, "Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," in *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51–76, excerpted on *OUPblog*, 29 June 2010, http://blog.oup.com/2010/06/afghanistan.

58. Kilcullen, "Measuring Progress"; see also David Kilcullen, "Notes on Operational Metrics for Counterinsurgency," Washington, DC: the Pentagon, 8 April 2005, www.docstoc.com/docs/115200789/Operational-Metrics-for-Irregular-Warfare-and-Counterinsurgency.

59. Kilcullen, "Measuring Progress."

60. Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles," 137.

61. Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles," 136.

62. Bentham articulated his vision in a number of works, most prominent among them *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* and *A Fragment on Government*. See J. H. Burns, "Happiness and Utility: Jeremy Bentham's Equation," *Utilitas* 17 (2005): 46–61.

63. Lansdale is quoted as saying, "When was an 'expert' last invited to be a guest in an 'average' Filipino household to share a meal? When did he last spend a night with Filipinos in the provinces? When did he last travel . . . in a manner permitting the gathering of real opinions? [Does] he honestly know whereof he speaks?" Currey, *Lansdale*, 83.

64. The United States used anthropology as an instrument of pacification and administration of intransigent Native Americans. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was the best example of how ethnographic knowledge was put to use in pacification. Cathleen D. Cahill, *Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States Indian Service, 1869–1933* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). On how ethnographic knowledge of the "ghost dance" was used to militarily subjugate the Lakota, see Jeffrey Ostler, "Conquest and the State: Why the United States Employed Massive Military Force to Suppress the Lakota Ghost Dance," *Pacific Historical Review* 65 (1996): 217–48. In Vietnam, the main counterinsurgency instruments of the United States, the Marine Corps's village-based Combined Action Programme and the Army/CIA/USAID's Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), whose most famous component was the assassination and detention Phoenix Program, both are said to have used local knowledge and local client relations to advance their work. See Khalili, *Time in the Shadows*. As for older empires, for the French military's dependence on ethnographic knowledge in Algeria, see, especially, Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). For the British uses, see note 32, above.

65. Currey, *Lansdale*, 26–28.

66. Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 38 (2005): 42–48.

67. American Anthropological Association, "Final Report on the Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program," 14 October 2009, blog.aaanet.org/2009/12/08/aaa-commission-releases-final-report-on-army-human-terrain-system/. Also see Sharon Weinberger, "Pentagon Cultural Analyst Helped with Interrogations: 'Experiment' Raises Alarm among Social Scientists," *Nature* 18 October 2011, nature.com/news/2011/111018/full/news.2011.598.html.

68. Montgomery Cybele Carlough, "Pax Britannica: British Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland, 1969–1982" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1994).

69. Binkley, "Happiness."

70. Berlant, "Intimacy," 281.

71. Lauren Berlant, "A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages," *Cultural Anthropology* 26 (2011): 686.